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Article 6

considerations of competence, enter in hiring, promoting,
and firing. But be that as it may: duly qualified academic
freedom is often egregiously infringed on in religiously
based institutions. The infringements occur when the
religious qualifications are applied unjustly: for example,
when they are never fully stated, or not stated clearly at the
time of appointment; when their application is arbitrary or
irregular; or when their is no recourse available to the
victim.
Over the years, I have acquired a broad acquaintance with
the religiously based colleges and universities of America.
I have learned that the history of these institutions is
littered with stories of unjust, often grossly unjust,
infringements on academic freedom. The stories constitute
a shameful blotch on the reputation of these colleges and
universities and put into question the sincerity of those who
profess high religious ideals for them. I defend the right of
these colleges and universities to attach religious

qualifications to academic freedom within their
institutions. But I must, and will, add that all too often,
they violate the personhood of their faculty members in the
way they apply the qualifications. Often, the person
violated is a brother or sister in the faith of those who
perpetuate the violation.
My own view, then, is that the best service the AAUP can
continue to render to this teeming multitude of American
institutions of higher education is to compose and
recommend model codes of procedure for resolving issues
of academic freedom. Almost always, it is in the
procedure, not in the qualifications as such, that the
injustice lies. Where there is no rule of law but only the
command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrariness
reign, where one never knows when and why the ax will
fall, there justice weeps.

Nicholas Wolterstorff is Noah Porter professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University.
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As a group, religiously affiliated colleges are much like
those with no religious connections. Some have a lot of
money, but most get by on less. Some have wide name
recognition; others enjoy a regional reputation or none at
all. Some have sensitive and competent administrators
who are on good terms with faculty, and some fall short of
that blessed state. Some maintain high standards of
academic excellence, but others achieve more modest (if
not to say mediocre) levels of academic quality.
Religiously affiliated institutions resemble their secular
counterparts in these and other ways because they are
subject to the same forces and circumstances that affect all
of higher education. At the same time, however, the
religious identity of these colleges has the potential to set
them apart by making a distinct contribution to their
character and quality. In the area of community life, for
example institutional aspirations and policies are often
explicitly linked to religious commitment or identity.
My own college is one of twenty-eight institutions
affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America. These colleges see lives of service, the
integration of values and practice, and the ideals of

character and community as essential to their identity.
Insofar as people on campus--in or outside the religious
tradition--value such goals, pursuing them and achieving
them will be perceived as adding to the college's quality.
It is .not so surprising when the religious identity of a
college or university is taken to contribute to its
community life, but observers of higher education seem
less likely to view religious commitment as integral to
academic goals. Many·people see religion and academics
as uneasy partners, if not completely at odds. This
inclination shows itself when we think or speak of schools
as being pretty good academically in spite of their church
or religious affiliation. It is only fair to note that we have
a good deal of evidence--historical and contemporary--to
justify such reactions. But the question is whether such a
state of affairs must be. Are there ways in which the
religious commitments of colleges and universities can and
do serve their academic aspirations?

The answer to this question is yes on several grounds.
Take, for example, the conception of service already
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mentioned in the context of campus life. Many church
related colleges were founded as mission institutions--not
in a narrowly evangelical sense, but in that of service to
individuals and society. Service is central to the academic
purpose of these schools. In Models of Christian Higher
Education, Pepperdine professor of religion Richard
Hughes identifies the ongoing theological commitment to
service as a chief contribution to the life of the mind in
historically Mennonite colleges--which are but one group
of colleges among many to have such a commitment.
Service is learning in practice, and although neither the
practice nor the pedagogy of applied learning is exclusive
to church-related educational communities, the religious
commitments of such institutions straightforwardly affect
their academic quality through their emphasis on service.

INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE

At the institutional level, religious identity serves academic
goals by providing a framework for integrating disciplinary
pursuits and perspectives. We may be lucky enough to
escape the extreme ideological and administrative strife
leading to what English professors Cary Nelson and
Stephen Watt, in Academic Keywords: A Devil's
Dictionary for Higher Education, call entrepreneurial
disciplinarity, which despairs of identifying any common
institutional mission, even within disciplines. But tension
between disciplinary specialization and integrated
understanding is a perennial academic problem, one that is
increasingly acute in undergraduate liberal arts colleges but
my no means restricted to such institutions.
Religiously affiliated colleges and universities have, it
seems, a great advantage in addressing this problem.
Insofar as the core claims of the affiliated religious
tradition cut across disciplinary lines, and insofar as those
claims are taken seriously, they provide a set of questions
that can help to integrate the various elements of a course
of study. (These core claims or questions serve this
academic function for all members of the college
community--whether they are in the affiliated religious
tradition or not.)

I use the phrase "educational communities" advisedly,
because it is plain that higher education is a communal
activity. Even those who are inclined to view Plato's
allegory of the cave--a tale of individual enlightenment--as
the paradigm of true learning cannot ignore the fact that the
story, like all of Plato's ideas, is offered in dialogue form.
Teaching and learning take place in networks of committed
relationships. (Plato's own academy was a religious
community of sorts that endured for nearly a millennium.)
Religion is certainly not the only basis for community, but
just as certainly, it is a common one. Is religious
commitment, particularly in what has been called the
Hebrew-Christian tradition, as fruitful a foundation for
academic communities as other shared commitments?
Education theorist Parker Palmer and Mark Schwehn, dean
of Christ College at Valparaiso University, to name just
two, believe that it is.

Of course, if the religious commitment of the institution
amounts to no more than lip service, or if the core
questions are seen as b�ing imposed on some by others or
widely held to be irrelevant to serious scholarly inquiry,
then this particular benefit is unlikely to result. It follows
that the more substantive the religious commitment, the
greater the academic benefit. Substantive religious
commitment in an institutions means, in part, having a
faculty and administration that take the core questions of
the tradition seriously. Respect for these questions and
attention to them does not imply an imposed consensus
about their answers. In fact, having the broadest possible
range of perspectives on the common questions would
seem to facilitate the. integration of a course of study. And
such integration is a hallmark of educational quality.

In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn emphasizes the role of
community in knowing and, therefore, in learning. The
intellectual life, he suggests, is inseparable from the moral
life, and the Christian tradition, among others, nourishes
both. The pursuit of truth, writes Schwehn, is linked
inextricably to care taken with the lives and the thoughts of
others. Thus, he argues, the academic life requires such
spiritual values as humility, self-sacrifice, and charity.
Whole-hearted acceptance of Schwehn's communitarian
epistemology is not necessary for the purposes of the
present argument. To whatever extent readers recognize
the role and importance of community in higher learning,
religious commitment can be seen to support that learning.

ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE

If religiously affiliated universities are the natural habitats
for applied learning, paradigm learning communities, and
bastions against the malaise of fragmentation and
disciplinary disintegration, why do we find ourselves so
suspicious of their academic potential? What explains our
propensity to say, "They are pretty good in spite of the
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religion"?
I acknowledged one answer earlier: religiously committed
institutions and individuals do not have an exemplary track
record. Readers of these pages are as likely as anyone to
be aware of offenses against academic excellence in the
name of religious commitment. The offenses most often
take the form of undermining a key principle of such
excellence: autonomous inquiry, or academic freedom. I
do not propose to defend religious (or any other)
encroachments on academic freedom. Some of them--past
and present--simply cannot be justified.
Certain practices might be supported by the claim that
. religious commitment serves academic goals and therefore
may legitimately qualify academic freedom. That may
well be so, although all such qualifications face the danger
of becoming self-defeating at some point for academic
institutions. But I don't wish to add to that long-standing
discussion here. Instead, I'll suggest two ways in which
religious commitment nurtures academic excellence by
supporting academic freedom. My remarks focus on the
Christian religious tradition--with which I am most
familiar--but their application goes beyond church-related
institutions.
TRUTH SEEKING

The first way in which religious commitment supports free
inquiry is by emphasizing truth seeking. This key
component of the Christian religious tradition
straightforwardly allies it with the most influential modern
thinking about free inquiry and expression. In On Liberty,
for example, John Stuart Mill bases his defense of absolute
freedom of expression on the value of truth and the
imperative to seek it.
Why isn't it obvious that religions professing to seek the
truth, a task served by open inquiry, have a strong interest
in academic freedom?
One explanation comes
immediately to mind: ironically, strong religious
commitment is often suspected of being weak on academic
inquiry precisely because of its dedication to truth. To
profess to have the truth (as religions do, after all) is, one
might suppose, to offer grounds for not continuing to look
for it, or to ask questions. Such an approach has too
commonly been characteristic of strong religious
commitment--both in and outside the academy.
The approach pointedly fails, of course, to take sufficient
account of uncertainty. One can do no better here than to

quote Mill: All silencing of discussion, he writes, is an
assumption of infallibility. To shut of the airing of the
alternative views on grounds that the truth is known is
implicitly to claim certainty. But Mill's reminder about
fallibility does not constitute an external restraint on the
Christian religious tradition as institutionally expressed.
The notion of human weakness--including epistemic
weakness--is as central to the Christian tradition as any
idea. Insofar as the possibility of being mistaken motivates
free inquiry in the pursuit of truth, such inquiry might be
a hallmark of the Christian tradition and its institutions of
learning.
So the Christian tradition--and, by extension, the learning
institutions associated with it--has internal reasons for
allowing free discussion, even of its own basic truth claims.
But it is not only when people suspect they might be
mistaken that they ought to welcome questioning; even
confidently held true beliefs require it. Mill argues that our
highest intellectual ideal is not simply to hold true beliefs,
but to hold them in a certain way:
"Even if the received opinion be...the whole truth; unless
it be suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and
earnestly contested, it will...be held in the measure of a
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds. And not only this, but...the meaning of
the doctrine itself will be lost or enfeebled, and deprived of
its vital effect on the character and conduct."
The approach Mill recommends seems crucial to fostering
active, engaged learning that will result in lives of
informed service. If religious commitment, as I said above,
stresses the need to seek truth, it would benefit as well
from the rigorous free discussion Mill advocates.
My argument that religious commitment supports academic/
freedom through its emphasis on truth seeking can be read
two ways: that it does so in principle, or that it does so. in
common practice. If read primarily in the first way, my
argument will be understood to promote free inquiry
religious grounds. This might seem to be a bizarre sort
preaching to the choir, since readers of Academe are,
and large, in little need of persuasion that free inquiry is
good idea. But active religious support for free inquiryi
I think, more common than many people suppose--now
in history. Even if it is not, mentioning the religi
argument for greater academic freedom reminds us, at
very least, that we need not choose between our religiou
commitment and our academic ideals.
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religious commitments that give rise to the liberal tradition
are certainly not the only basis for doing so, but they are an
important one.

FOUNDATIONS FOR FREE INQUIRY

The final point I wish to make goes one step further:
religious commitment may be more than merely congenial
to our academic ideals--it may be the foundation for them.
Ideals of free inquiry and expression come to us from a
political tradition that has, in the estimation of some, fallen
on hard times. A core aspiration of this tradition is
content-neutral institutional policies (those that, for
example, treat all religions in the United States or all ideas
in the academy equally). It is especially important, in the
liberal tradition, for policies to be neutral about substantive
claims of value or the nature of persons. But their need to
be so gives rise to a certain paradox, because justifying
liberal institutional policies requires an appeal to specific
claims about persons and value.

The defense of academic freedom demands a foundation.
Personal. and institutional religious commitment provides
one--not uniquely, but unquestionably.
Nicholas
Wolterstorff eloquently expresses this idea in his article in
this issue ofAcademe when he argues that the abridgement
of academic freedom constitutes a profound violation of
the person. In this world of ours, he writes, there's nothing
of greater worth than persons, and correspondingly, no
greater evil than the violation of persons. The violation of .
a person is the desecration of one of the images of God.
Injustice in the name of religion has, tragically, been as
common inside the academy as outside of it. But to really
make a stand in opposition to injustice, we need religion-
or something very like it. Providing such support is
potentially the greatest contribution of religious
commitment to academic excellence and to the policies that
promote and defend it. This contribution should not go
unrecognized; nor should it be allowed to remain a mere
possibility where it is as yet unrealized.

One response to this paradox has been to reject liberal
policies--either because neutrality is impossible, or because
the claims about the autonomy of persons that traditionally
ground them are deemed false. But rejecting such policies
is not an attractive option for defenders of academic
freedom. If it's impossible to make policies that are
neutral all the way down, the alternative is to defend
policies that are neutral in practice on the basis of
substantive commitments about persons and values. The

torm Bailey is assistant professor of philosophy at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa.
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